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The Paris Agreements required the constituent assembly to produce a constitution that “shall declare that Cambodia will apply a liberal democracy, based on pluralism.” The term “liberal democracy” has been attributed to Prince Sihanouk, who had called for Cambodia to be a liberal democratic state during earlier negotiations. It seems likely that he used this term in the context of the negotiations because he assumed it was what the U.S. representatives and other key participants in the Paris Conference wanted to hear. The concept certainly does not reflect the principles of government he applied when he was king or prime minister in the 1950s, and questions remain regarding the adaptability of the Western political theory of liberalism to the conditions of a Buddhist, extremely poor, and agrarian society such as Cambodia. The Paris Agreements do not define the term, although they enumerate eight elements of an electoral process that the constitution must mention and that, presumably, are part of the definition of liberal democracy.
First, elections must take place regularly, which one can assume to mean that the terms of national assembly members must be limited and that members must either be re- elected or a new candidate elected to occupy a seat in the assembly after the term expires.
Second, elections must be “genuine,” presumably meaning that the process must be free of manipulation. This criterion is close to the concept of fairness in an election.
Third and fourth are the rights to vote and to be elected.
Fifth, sufrage must be universal.
Sixth, and closely related to universality, is the concept of equal sufrage, meaning that every vote has the same value. Equal and universal sufrage supposes nondiscrimination.
Seventh, ballots must be secret.
Finally, Annex 5 requires that the constitution provide for full and fair possibilities to organize in order to participate in the electoral process. This requirement relates to the formation and functioning of political parties, the essential feature of pluralism, and the possibility of conducting a campaign to attract voters.
The eight elements cover the formal aspects of what is understood by “liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism.” The Paris Agreements properly dealt with all of the main post-conflict issues—ceasefire, repatriation, restored sovereignty and unity, transitional arrangements, and rehabilitation and reconstruction—except for the issue of responsibility for past abuses. The unwillingness to address the latter issue went so far as to exclude the word “genocide” from the text of the Paris Agreements, which referred instead to ensuring that “the policies and practices of the past shall never be allowed to return.” Moreover, none of the various drafts of the constitution referred to prosecutions or truth and reconciliation; they did not even mention the policies and practices of the past. The need to include the DK and China in the agreement and the Buddhist belief in reconciliation and love without retribution are strong arguments in favor of such silence, but impunity continues to be a major concern of Cambodian justice. Perhaps alienating the DK during the PICC was not an option and the Chinese vote was needed in the UN Security Council. But DK refusal to respect the Paris Agreements and continued violence would have justified a harder line at the time of the constitution’s drafting.
In any event, the product of the constitution-making process in 1993 was essentially a reversion to previous constitutions—combining elements of the 1947 and 1989 constitutions, with some liberalizing improvements—rather than a newly structured constitution built on Annex 5. This illustrates how Cambodian politics tended to outweigh the United Nations’ role as guarantor of the integrity of the Paris Agreements. Mixing the 1947 and 1989 constitutions, that is, combining the royalist electoral victors’ conception of stable government with CPP and State of Cambodia (SOC) habits as de facto government, makes sense in Cambodian politics.
However, the starting point of the agreements was an internationally agreed-upon definition of what was meant constitutionally by a liberal democracy on the basis of pluralism. UNTAC judged unwisely that it should respect Cambodian ways by allowing, first, the DK to behave contrary to the letter and the spirit of the agreements, and second, FUNCINPEC and the CPP to resolve a disputed election through pure politics. Its merits notwithstanding, the constitution was a victim of that politicization. One can argue that the constitution is better grounded in Cambodian culture than would have been the case if the United Nations had succeeded in making the parties comply strictly with the ideas of constitutionalism agreed to in Paris, or provided more guidance on constitution making beyond the guidelines for an electoral process that were contained in the Paris Agreements. However, restoring politics as usual allowed for much political violence, extreme delays in creating the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, continued impunity for the DK and other politically protected perpetrators of abuse, restrictions on press freedoms, and the lack of an independent judiciary. These problems would not have been eliminated merely by adopting a constitution that met the overly optimistic claim of Chem Sngoun, former minister of justice, who died in 1999, that it was “neither monarchical, nor republican, but a democratic constitution.” But a constitution-making process and constitution that were closer to what was achieved in South Africa might have encouraged less brute politics and more democracy.
Constitutional amendments in Cambodia are relatively unremarkable if measured quantitatively. Eleven amendments being made over the course of three decades might be considered a relatively high frequency, but not to the extent of being a cause of existential concern. Rather, amendment practice in Cambodia is interesting for a number of deeper, qualitative reasons. First, in many ways echoing the constitution-making process in 1993, the amendment process provided for by the Constitution is remarkably non-participatory. This, I would argue, reflects the extent to which the former process (a) took place before participation came to be seen as an international norm, 106 (b) was a product of a peace-making process that brought to an end a long period of civil war, and (c) was understood as a pact between the elites who led the parties to that conflict. 107 Hence, while the Cambodian Constitution has come to structure many everyday political contestations, with constitutional principles and vocabularies being cited by Cambodians from outside the political elite, formal amendment practice – and the institutions that enact it – has been largely dominated by Cambodia’s political elites, to the exclusion of other voices.
Hence, amendment practice in Cambodia can be understood to have been focused on adjusting, and ultimately undermining, the elite political settlement that underlay the 1993 constitution-making process. Since the peace-building and democratisation process – in which the 1993 constitution-making process was embedded – was itself precipitated by an effective stalemate between the parties to Cambodia’s long-running civil war, and since the results of the 1993, UN-administered elections failed to return a conclusive win for any one party, Cambodia’s post-conflict constitutional order prioritised power-sharing. In the decade or so aſter 1993, amendment practice was characterised by the uneasy pursuit of power-sharing arrangements by political parties that increasingly distrusted one another. Hence, amendments have been focused almost entirely either on adjusting political processes relating to the formation of coalition governments aſter an election, or on establishing new institutions to placate coalition partners and their clients. As such, amendment practice from this time supports the assessment of Laurrie Nathan, that ‘ signing a peace accord does not necessarily mark the end of the conflict resolution process, which might extend into the constitution-making phase’, such that the latter becomes ‘an arena of contestation and an opportunity to renegotiate the terms of the CPA [comprehensive peace agreement]’. 108 Taking this insight a step further, evidence from Cambodia also suggests that amendment practice in the years thereaſter might also provide insights into the aſterlife of a peace agreement.
Reflecting the gradual deterioration and eventual disintegration in Cambodia’s post-conflict political settlement, then, amendment practice in Cambodia has substantively shiſted. Specifically, whereas amendments between 1994 and 2014 (inclusive) were geared towards securing compromises and facilitating coalitions between political parties (and their respective elites), those amendments that came in 2018 have subsequently sought to consolidate and legitimise the dominance of the CPP. In the latter regard, recent amendments have either precluded the CPP’s opponents from competing in elections or holding high-office, and centralised power over the formation of new governments in the hands of political parties rather than the National Assembly. It is also interesting to note, here, the extent to which the shiſt in amendment practice has been procedural as well as substantive. Of course, one should be careful not to overstate the role of the National Assembly in the first two and a half decades aſter 1993, given the extent to which the Parliament was considered to be weak and bereſt of confidence. Nevertheless, Cambodia’s transition – which has elsewhere been called ‘backsliding’ or ‘reautocratisation’ – has been reflected not only in the substance of constitutional amendments, but also – procedurally – in the fact that constitutional amendments that used to emerge primarily from the legislature branch now tend to emerge (at least unofficially) from the executive branch.
In May 2025, tensions reemerged once again along the contested Cambodia–Thailand border near Preah Vihear temple, where a Cambodian soldier was killed during a military clash with Thai troops. What began as a deadly encounter evolved into an escalating confrontation involving artillery exchanges took place from July 24 to 28, 2025 – and, most notably, a leaked 17-minute phone call between Cambodia’s Senate President and former Prime Minister Hun Sen and Thailand’s suspended Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra. This call, in which the two former leaders discussed political turbulence and the border closure, quickly went viral after Hun Sen publicized it on social media, further stoking nationalist fervor on both sides.
While these developments reignited regional concerns about the fragile peace in mainland Southeast Asia, many commentaries have remained narrowly focused on Thailand’s domestic political instability or Hun Sen’s reputation as a political tactician. These interpretations are not without merit. However, they fail to fully account for the deeper symbolic logic that shapes the Cambodian regime’s response to external conflict: the ideological consolidation of “peace” as both a sacred achievement and a legitimizing narrative for authoritarian rule. In this light, the 2025 skirmish should not be seen as a separate discourse from Cambodia’s “peace at all costs” rhetoric but rather as a performance that paradoxically reinforces it.
Manufacturing Peace, Performing Power and Justice
At the heart of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)’s claim to legitimacy lies its carefully curated image as the guardian of peace. After more than three decades in power, former Prime Minister Hun Sen has sought to cement his legacy as the leader who brought Cambodia out of decades of civil war, culminating in the defeat and reintegration of the Khmer Rouge remnants in 1998 through his much-touted “win-win policy.” In the years since, this narrative has not only been enshrined in public monuments – most prominently the 54-meter-high Win-Win Monument unveiled in 2018 – but also embedded in public discourse through a ubiquitous slogan: “Thank you peace” (Arkun Santepheap).
Introduced formally in January 2020, the “Thank you peace” campaign calls upon Cambodians to appreciate the sacrifices that led to the nation’s stability and to remain vigilant in its defense. The slogan has since been plastered across ministries, hospitals, schools, and public billboards, becoming a daily mantra of political loyalty. It is a reminder that peace is not merely a historical event, but a present condition maintained by the CPP, and by extension, Hun Sen himself. As peace is turned into a commodity and a brand, dissent becomes not just politically dangerous but morally suspect.
This domestic mythology raises a critical question: if peace is such a foundational narrative for the CPP, why risk a conflict with Thailand that threatens to unravel it? Why would a country with limited military capability, economic dependency, and diplomatic vulnerability provoke a skirmish it can scarcely afford?
Conflict as Continuity
It is precisely this paradox that reveals the regime’s deeper political strategy. Rather than contradicting the peace narrative, the border clash with Thailand functions as an instrument to reassert and dramatize it. Peace, in this schema, is not merely the absence of war – it is a condition that must be perpetually defended. Conflict, when framed correctly, reinforces the myth of peace as a fragile and hard-won prize that only the ruling elite can secure.
In this sense, the 2025 conflict is a continuation, not a departure, from the regime’s ideological project. The “enemy at the gate” – whether it be domestic dissidents, foreign critics, or rival neighbors – becomes a rhetorical device to solidify internal unity. The border becomes both a geographical frontier and a symbolic line separating chaos from order, the past from the present, and, most critically, Hun Sen’s Cambodia from the one that came before.
This framing helps explain why Hun Sen’s decision to publicize the phone call with Paetongtarn Shinawatra was not a diplomatic faux past but a calculated strategy of irregular warfare. It externalized Cambodia’s grievances, redirected domestic anxieties toward a foreign adversary, and cast the Cambodian leadership as transparent and resolute in the face of foreign aggression. Even critics within Cambodia found it difficult to openly oppose the government’s handling of the crisis, lest they appear unpatriotic.
A Calculated Risk Amid Economic Headwinds
That said, the risks of confrontation were real and potentially costly – especially in economic terms. In April 2025, the Trump administration announced a 49% tariff on Cambodian exports to the United States, citing trade imbalances. This decision struck a major blow to Cambodia’s already fragile economy, particularly its textiles and apparel sector. Yet rather than retreat into isolationism in the global economy, the Cambodian government quickly initiated diplomatic negotiations with Washington D.C. The first round of trade talks was held in May in Washington, D.C., resulted in a gradual easing of the tariff – first down to 36%, and then to 19% as announced on August 1, 2025 – making Cambodia becoming a competitive trade partner like its regional neighbors.
Given these efforts to reduce economic pressure and rehabilitate ties with the United States, it would be politically and financially counterintuitive for Cambodia to instigate a war merely to distract from domestic challenges. Contrary to accusations by Thai commentators such as Thanachate Wisaijorn and former Ambassador Pisan Manawapat, the Cambodian government’s actions suggest a dual strategy: using conflict as a unifying nationalist spectacle while simultaneously pursuing pragmatic diplomacy to stabilize external relationships.
Nationalist Mobilization in the Social Media Age
What is especially noteworthy about the 2025 skirmish is how it catalyzed an emotional and symbolic response among younger Cambodians – many of whom were born after the war and raised in the relative stability of the post-Khmer Rouge era in the 1990s and 2000s. For this generation, the border conflict was a jolting reminder of the fragility of peace. The images of displaced civilians, wounded soldiers, and cratered landscapes went viral on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and X – sparking a wave of patriotic sentiment rarely seen in recent years.
Actors, influencers, and civil society groups joined the call to “stand with our troops,” organizing donation drives, posting messages of solidarity, and even boycotting Thai businesses. A Cambodian famous rapper, VannDa, arguably Cambodia’s most popular contemporary music artist, released a song title, “We Will Never Forget” on August 1, 2025, amassed over 350K views in less than 10 hours after its release. Some young entrepreneurs and content creators such as Pich Pisey pledged to shift their supply chains to local Cambodian producers. Others invoked history, recalling past struggles for territorial sovereignty, to amplify the stakes of the moment.
This groundswell of emotion, while partly organic, was also subtly orchestrated. Government-aligned media outlets and social media campaigns highlighted heroic narratives, emphasized unity, and framed criticism of the conflict as ungrateful to the sacrifices of those defending the nation. In doing so, the ruling CPP effectively turned a geopolitical crisis into a reaffirmation of national purpose – at least for the moment.
Policies and Patterns: State-Abetted Transnational Crime in Cambodia as a Global Security Threat គោលនយោបាយ និងលំនាំ៖ ឧក្រិដ្ឋកម្មឆ្លងដែនដែលប្រព្រឹត្តដោយរដ្ឋនៅកម្ពុជា ជាការគំរាមកំហែងសន្តិសុខសកល
Box 2. A Cautionary Note on Harm Minimization As one interviewee stated, “You only make sense of this when you start to look at Cambodia as a true mafia state.” They went on to suggest that, once this conceptual leap is made, observers must recognize that “all you can realistically do is to make it more difficult for them to be so brazen, to push them back into the shadows a bit.”
While the conclusions of this study overwhelmingly endorse this sentiment, an approach prioritizing “harm minimization” is neither a guaranteed victory nor without its own risks of collateral damage. These risks can be broadly viewed as falling within three categories. – First is the potential spillover impact on vulnerable Cambodians. FATF grey-listing in particular can be viewed as a form of broad-brush sanctioning which has a measured impact of a 7.6% decline in capital investment in listed countries.
While widespread capture of productive economic activities by the Cambodian elite ensures that the FATF’s punitive measure will impact its intended target, more marginal populations will also be impacted as access to global capital recedes. Concerned governments should be prepared to mobilize to offset spillover impacts as they reach Cambodian labor.
– Second, there is a noted apprehension in Western governments that Cambodia is drifting toward China and that an isolating “harm minimization” strategy might accelerate this trend. In general, interviewees objected to this logic. While almost all viewed it as objectively true that Cambodia largely now exists within China’s hegemonic orbit, few agreed that further cost imposition would meaningfully accelerate this trajectory. Several interviewees pointed to Cambodia’s irrevocable slide in that direction despite years of a mostly conciliatory Western approach. For instance, they highlighted the heavy focus of U.S. foreign policy towards Cambodia in recent years on the prevention/mediation of a China-funded Ream Naval Base. This effort–which seemingly sublimated all other U.S. foreign policy goals in the Kingdom–ultimately failed to prevent the feared outcome. Other interviewees disagreed altogether that the risks of modest further geopolitical alignment with Beijing could in any way outweigh the harms currently extending from the regime, which could be meaningfully stemmed by a coordinated harm minimization effort.
– The final and perhaps most existential risk to a harder international line on Cambodia is the one posed to a highly vulnerable local civil society and the vital resources they bring to bear in the effort to constrain the state-party’s portfolio of transnational and ecological crimes, as well as its abuses more broadly. This brings us to the study’s next key recommendation.
