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Constitutional amendments in Cambodia are relatively unremarkable if measured quantitatively. Eleven amendments being made over the course of three decades might be considered a relatively high frequency, but not to the extent of being a cause of existential concern. Rather, amendment practice in Cambodia is interesting for a number of deeper, qualitative reasons. First, in many ways echoing the constitution-making process in 1993, the amendment process provided for by the Constitution is remarkably non-participatory. This, I would argue, reflects the extent to which the former process (a) took place before participation came to be seen as an international norm, 106 (b) was a product of a peace-making process that brought to an end a long period of civil war, and (c) was understood as a pact between the elites who led the parties to that conflict. 107 Hence, while the Cambodian Constitution has come to structure many everyday political contestations, with constitutional principles and vocabularies being cited by Cambodians from outside the political elite, formal amendment practice – and the institutions that enact it – has been largely dominated by Cambodia’s political elites, to the exclusion of other voices.
Hence, amendment practice in Cambodia can be understood to have been focused on adjusting, and ultimately undermining, the elite political settlement that underlay the 1993 constitution-making process. Since the peace-building and democratisation process – in which the 1993 constitution-making process was embedded – was itself precipitated by an effective stalemate between the parties to Cambodia’s long-running civil war, and since the results of the 1993, UN-administered elections failed to return a conclusive win for any one party, Cambodia’s post-conflict constitutional order prioritised power-sharing. In the decade or so aſter 1993, amendment practice was characterised by the uneasy pursuit of power-sharing arrangements by political parties that increasingly distrusted one another. Hence, amendments have been focused almost entirely either on adjusting political processes relating to the formation of coalition governments aſter an election, or on establishing new institutions to placate coalition partners and their clients. As such, amendment practice from this time supports the assessment of Laurrie Nathan, that ‘ signing a peace accord does not necessarily mark the end of the conflict resolution process, which might extend into the constitution-making phase’, such that the latter becomes ‘an arena of contestation and an opportunity to renegotiate the terms of the CPA [comprehensive peace agreement]’. 108 Taking this insight a step further, evidence from Cambodia also suggests that amendment practice in the years thereaſter might also provide insights into the aſterlife of a peace agreement.
Reflecting the gradual deterioration and eventual disintegration in Cambodia’s post-conflict political settlement, then, amendment practice in Cambodia has substantively shiſted. Specifically, whereas amendments between 1994 and 2014 (inclusive) were geared towards securing compromises and facilitating coalitions between political parties (and their respective elites), those amendments that came in 2018 have subsequently sought to consolidate and legitimise the dominance of the CPP. In the latter regard, recent amendments have either precluded the CPP’s opponents from competing in elections or holding high-office, and centralised power over the formation of new governments in the hands of political parties rather than the National Assembly. It is also interesting to note, here, the extent to which the shiſt in amendment practice has been procedural as well as substantive. Of course, one should be careful not to overstate the role of the National Assembly in the first two and a half decades aſter 1993, given the extent to which the Parliament was considered to be weak and bereſt of confidence. Nevertheless, Cambodia’s transition – which has elsewhere been called ‘backsliding’ or ‘reautocratisation’ – has been reflected not only in the substance of constitutional amendments, but also – procedurally – in the fact that constitutional amendments that used to emerge primarily from the legislature branch now tend to emerge (at least unofficially) from the executive branch.
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Cambodia,
– having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas on 3 March 2023, following a trial deemed by UN experts to have ‘failed to meet the standard of either Cambodian or international human rights law’, Phnom Penh Municipal Court sentenced Kem Sokha to 27 years in jail, which he is temporarily allowed to serve under house arrest, and indefinitely suspended his political rights to vote and to stand for election;
B. whereas Kem Sokha the former Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) president was arrested in 2017 over accusations of conspiracy to overthrow Prime Minister Hun Sen and held in arbitrary pre-trial detention until his conditional release into house arrest on 10 September 2018;
C. whereas since the Supreme Court of Cambodia dissolved the largest opposition party, the CNRP, the Cambodian Government has been cracking down on members of the political opposition by jailing and fining them, and forcing them into exile;
D. whereas Prime Minister Hun Sen has been in power almost without interruption for 38 years and the ruling party holds absolute power over the state and legislative bodies;
E. whereas the government crackdown on independent media, civil society organisations and political opposition that began in 2017 has continued, including through sham mass trials, the persecution of activists such as Seng Theary and the leadership and members of the opposition Candlelight Party, the restriction of liberties and the closure on 13 February 2023 of VOD, one of Cambodia’s last independent media outlets;
1. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of Kem Sokha and all opposition officials and activists convicted or detained on politically motivated charges;
2. Urges the Cambodian authorities to ensure free and fair elections in July 2023, allowing all political parties to carry out equal, free and transparent electoral campaigns under a more inclusive and transparent national election committee; calls for the immediate reinstatement of the CNRP for participation in the 2023 elections;
3. Calls on the authorities to put an end to all forms of harassment, intimidation and politically motivated criminal charges against members of the opposition, trade unionists, human right defenders (HRDs), civil society and media actors and for the immediate reinstatement of VOD;
4. Calls for the coordinated use of available political avenues including the further suspension of Cambodia’s ‘Everything But Arms’ status if the 2023 elections deviate from international standards or violations of human rights continue;
5. Urges the Commission to define human rights benchmarks for its ongoing enhanced engagement with the Cambodian authorities, and to provide assistance to Cambodia’s civil society and HRDs;
6. Urges the Council to adopt targeted sanctions, under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, to hold accountable all persons responsible for serious human rights violations and the dissolution and subsequent repression of the Cambodian opposition;
7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR, the ASEAN Secretary-General and the Government, Prime Minister and National Assembly of Cambodia.
We, the Cambodian citizens living in Canada and United States of America, propose to the Royal Kingdom of Cambodia to adopt the law allowing all Cambodians overseas to exercise rights to vote in each country which they are living. This is in conformity with the Chapter 33 of the Constitution of Royal Kingdom of Cambodia stating that “Cambodian people living overseas are aided by the State”.
Majority of overseas Cambodians continue to be concerned for the welfare of their homeland and have the determination to participate in the destiny of their motherland through the elections of their representatives in Cambodia.
We understand that the process of a free, fair, just and acceptable election to ensure stability, democracy, and genuine development requires the participation of all Cambodian citizens living inside or outside of Cambodia and for them to exercise their rights to vote without barriers and obstructions. The National Election Committee (NEC) must have true independence, transparency, and integrity including opening space for democracy by allowing the participation of all those with different political beliefs and with the release of all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience and dropping all charges against all politicians in exile so that they can equally participate in the upcoming 2023 national election.
We want to see the upcoming 2023 election be conducted in a credible political environment that allows all citizens from all political beliefs to participate and be accepted by all parties and by the international community.
We want to see the upcoming election 2023 is full of credible political environment participated by all political beliefs and parties and could be accepted by all parties and international organizations.
Signatures representing Cambodians overseas living in Canada and the United States of America
